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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF FACT WAS NOT DISPUTED
OR CONTRADICTED BY DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY OR
EVIDENCE AND IS COMPLETELY SUPPORTIVE OF THE
ARGUMENTS OF PLAINTIFF CONTAINED IN THE BRIEF OF
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

The Defendant asserts in her reply brief that the Plaintiff's
statement of facts contained errors and misstatements. It is true
that the term "commissions" should not have been used and the term
"bonus"

should

have

mischaracterization

of

been
income,

used,
there

but
have

other
been

than
no

that

factual

misstatements or errors in the statements of fact as contained in
the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

In each instance,

throughout the statement of facts, the Plaintiff has cited to the
transcript of trial and cited to the testimony of the Defendant,
also in the transcript of trial.
The Defendant has brought to the Court's attention issues
relating to the income of the Plaintiff.

It was stipulated at the

time of trial and undisputed that the 1992 income received by the
Plaintiff was $114,500.00, which included a substantial bonus of
$14,500.00.

(See TR, p. 18, 11. 21-32; TR, p. 21, 11. 18-24.) The

Plaintiff's bonus received was included in his monthly gross income
for the purposes of calculating both child support and alimony.
Nowhere in the transcript of trial did the Defendant attempt to
assert that the income as set forth by Plaintiff in his statement
of facts was other than his correct and true income.
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Again,

the

Defendant's

characterization

statements as being misleading

of

Plaintiff's

and contrary to testimony

is

inappropriate and incorrect. As cited in the facts of the case in
the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, the Plaintiff testified
that Defendant worked at different jobs during the marriage. (TR,
p. 19, 11. 4-8.)

The Plaintiff specifically referred to a period

of two years from 1988 through 1990 that the Defendant ran a day
care center from the parties' home.
Defendant disputed
testimony.

None of the testimony of the

that; and, in fact, confirmed

Plaintiff's

(See TR, p. 154, 11. 5-18.)

The Defendant has attempted to attack Plaintiff's statements
regarding his agreeability to paying for private schooling.

It is

clear from the transcript of trial and the testimony of the
Plaintiff, that he believed that the payment of child support on
his part to Defendant in the sum of $1,361.00 would be adeguate to
meet the needs of the children, including the cost of private
school. (TR, pp. 22-23.) That in itself disputes that he agreed to
pay for private schooling of the children.
Lastly, the Plaintiff's statement that the ReadiAccess loan
and tax liability that he listed as marital debts is disputed by
the record is completely incorrect.

The Plaintiff testified that

during the later stages of the parties' separation, the Defendant
ran up a number of expenses reguiring that Plaintiff take out a
2
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loan for $7,500.00 in order to pay off those expenses.

He also

testified that he had an income tax obligation of approximately
$4,300.00, which was accrued during the period of the parties7
marriage.

(See TR, p. 32, 11. 2-11.) The Plaintiff specifically

stated that the overdraft account or loan was a debt incurred to
pay for the expenses of the Defendant and was incurred during the
marriage and that the account was opened to cover the expenses that
were incurred during the marriage. (See TR, p. 32, 11. 21-35, p.
33, 11. 1-7.)
There is absolutely no evidence that the Plaintiff raided or
closed bank accounts and used funds for his own use and benefit and
the allegations of the Defendant otherwise, were not supported by
the evidence. It is clear that the Defendant has not appealed any
decision

of

the

trial

court

relating

to

"reimbursement" to

Defendant of any funds that Defendant perceives Plaintiff absconded
with

from the

joint marital

assets.

Again, therefore, the

Defendant's statements regarding the Plaintiff's handling of the
finances really does misconstrue the facts as set forth at the time
of trial as contained in the transcript of trial.
II.

PLAINTIFF AT NO TIME AGREED TO PAY THE COST OF
PRIVATE SCHOOLING FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN AND IT WAS
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO MAKE THE AWARD IN
ADDITION TO BASE SUPPORT.

The Defendant is asserting in the Defendant's reply brief that
the

Plaintiff

agreed,

before

the

separation

and

3
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after

the

separation, to pay the costs of private schooling.

The Defendant

has asserted that the Plaintiff agreed to share the cost after
separation to the time of trial.

However, the Defendant has

provided no evidence of the same. In fact, no evidence of the same
exists.

The outstanding court order regarding temporary relief

ordered the Plaintiff to pay child support, only, and day care and
made no specific orders regarding the payment of the cost of
private school. A copy of that order, which governed the behavior
of the parties pending trial on this matter is appended hereto as
Addendum "A". That Order and Restraining Order, which entered all
orders relating to the payment of support and/or private school,
states in paragraph 9 that the Plaintiff would pay child support of
$1,169.00 and one-half of any work or educated related child care
costs. Again, there was no order in place ordering that Plaintiff
bear the expense of a private school.
The Defendant has stated in her reply brief that the Uniform
Child Support Act contained in §78-45-7, et seq., is adjusted for
taxes and the claiming of tax exemptions.
cites no support for that assertion.

However, the Defendant

In addition, the Defendant

has attempted to state that since Plaintiff was awarded the tax
exemption that somehow gave the court authority to deviate from the
guidelines without setting forth the reasoning and basis for that

4
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deviation as required by the guidelines.

(See Utah Code Annotated

§78-45-7.2.)
The Defendant's argument that since child care expenses and
uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the base
child support guidelines, that private school expenses are also a
separate issue is nonsensical.

If our legislature believed that

the private school cost was a separate issue that needed to be
addressed by it and was not contained within the base support, it
would make sense that there would be a specific statute as there is
with child care expenses and uninsured medical and dental expenses.
III. THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL TO THE COURT'S DENIAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION TO
CUSTODY MAY BE MOOT.
Plaintiff has argued in his Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant that the court erred or abused its discretion in denying
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation in Re: Child
Custody.

The Plaintiff believes that the arguments and reasoning

set forth in his Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant adequately
address that issue.
However, commencing with November, 1992, the minor children
have been in the physical care and custody of the Plaintiff and his
spouse, Merrilee Caldwell, pursuant to an order of temporary
custody, and they remain in his temporary care and custody as of
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the date of this response.

Therefore, the Court may deem that

issue moot.
CONCLUSION
The relief sought by the Plaintiff on his cross-appeal seeks
an order from this Court reversing the requirement that Plaintiff
pay one-half of the cost of private schooling and reversing the
court's order requiring him to maintain life insurance naming the
Defendant as beneficiary.

Further, Plaintiff asks that the Court

affirm the trial court's determination

regarding alimony and

attorney's fees. Given the physical custody of the minor children
with the Plaintiff, however, the Plaintiff withdraws his request
that the Court remand any issues to the trial court, particularly
relating to the best interests of the minor children, as that issue
is currently before the Court. Further, the Plaintiff respectfully
requests that each party be responsible for his or her own court
costs and attorney's fees on appeal.

\

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
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A D D E N D U M

" A "

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
*

ORDER AND RESTRAINING ORDER

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Sawaya

Plaintiff,
914902308 DA

vs.
MARY E. RANDOLPH,
*

Defendant.

Hearing

on

Plaintiff's

Motion

for Temporary

Relief and

Restraining Order and the Cross Motion for Temporary Relief of the
Defendant, was held at a regular term of the above entitled Court,
pursuant to notice, July 18, 1991, before Domestic Relations
Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.
for

authorization

to

close

sale

The Motion of the Plaintiff
of

residence

and

to

sell

automobile, together with the Temporary Restraining Order of the
Defendant was heard at a regular term of the above entitled Court,
pursuant to notice on August 14, 1991 before Domestic Relations
Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

Plaintiff appeared at both

1
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Hettinger.

Defendant appeared in person at both hearings and was

represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser.

The issues were

argued to the Court by proffer and submitted to the Commissioner
for recommendation. The Commissioner, having recommended approval
of

the matters

stipulated

to by

the

parties

through

their

respective counsel, and having taken the contested matters and
issues under advisement; and the Commissioner, having reviewed the
pleadings, respective Motions and Affidavits of the parties on file
herein, and being fully advised in the premises, made the following
recommendations:
1.

By stipulation of the parties the marital home and

residence be sold and the net proceeds divided equally, except that
the Plaintiff is to pay $2,900.00 toward the roof replacement
and/or repairs from his share of the proceeds.
2. That Plaintiff may have the possession and use of the 1972
Porsche automobile and Defendant is awarded the exclusive temporary
possession and use of the 1988 Dodge Caravan during the pendency of
this action.

Plaintiff shall have the right to sell the 1972

Porsche automobile during the pendency of this action on condition
that he provide a complete accounting of the sale of said vehicle
to the Defendant, through counsel.
3. Plaintiff is to pay to the Defendant the sum of $1,500.00
advance on support obligation, which sum is to be credited against
any temporary child support or alimony awarded Defendant.
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5.

Plaintiff is to continue to maintain his health and

accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the Defendant and
the minor children of the parties during the pendency of this
action.

In that Defendant is currently a student with no income,

the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay any medical or dental
expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor children which is
not paid by insurance.
6.

Plaintiff is to maintain his present life insurance

coverage on his life in force during the pendency of this action
without change of beneficiary. Plaintiff is to notify Defendant of
any recent changes of beneficiary.
7. A mutual Restraining Order is to issue that neither party
is to harass, annoy, touch, harm or injure the other and further
that with the exception of the sale of the marital home and 1972
Porsche automobile, neither party is to sell, encumber, dispose,
transfer or otherwise dissipate any of the marital property or
assets without mutual consent of the parties or order of the Court.
8. The Commissioner finds that Defendant has been the primary
caretaker of the minor children during the marriage.

Defendant is

currently unemployed and attending school and is therefore able to
provide personal care rather than surrogate care for the minor
3
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temporary care, custody and control of the minor children and the
Commissioner so recommends.

The Plaintiff should be awarded

liberal and reasonable visitation rights with the minor children.
Should the parties be unable to agree, then visitation should be
interpreted in accordance with the Court's standard schedule. Each
party should be ordered to provide the other party with a current
residence address and phone number.
9. Child support should be based on Plaintiff's current gross
monthly income of $7,125.00 per month and zero (0) income for
Defendant, resulting in a child support obligation of $1,169.00 per
month.

Plaintiff should also be ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of

any work or education related child care costs actually incurred by
Defendant.

Child support and work related or education child care

costs are to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month and 1/2
on or before the 20th of the month commencing with July 20, 1991.
10.
temporary

The Commissioner finds that Defendant is in need of
alimony

during

the pendency

of this action.

The

Commissioner finds that Defendant's monthly living expenses are
inflated and over stated by approximately one-third.

Therefore,

the Plaintiff should pay temporary alimony to Defendant in the sum
of $1,000.00 per month.

Alimony is to be payable with the child

support and child care costs, 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month
and 1/2 on or before the 2 0th of the month commencing July 20,
4
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11.

In that Defendant is currently a student with no income,

the Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and pay any marital
indebtedness incurred prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint.
12.

Each party expects to receive in excess of $20,000.00 at

the closing on the sale of the marital home and it appears fair and
equitable that each party should pay 1/2 of the moving expenses,
with a final determination of apportionment of these expenses to be
made at the time of trial or settlement.
Pursuant to Article 4, "DOMESTIC RELATIONS" Section
6-4 01(2) (E) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration, each party shall
have ten (10) days of the date of the recommended Order made by
Minute Entry to file written objections thereto; and further, the
recommendations of the Commissioner shall be in effect as an Order
until such time as the Court modifies or changes an Order, now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded the temporary care,

custody and control of the two (2) minor children of the parties,
to-wit:

KIRA, age 9 and ERIKA, age 5, during the pendency of this

action, subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit with the
children at reasonable times and places.

If the parties cannot

agree on visitation, then visitation should be interpreted in
accordance with the Court's standard schedule.
2.

Each party is ordered to provide the other with a current
5
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residence address and telephone number during the pendency of this
action.
3.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff as

temporary child support the sum of $lf169.00 per month.

Plaintiff

is ordered to pay 1/2 of any work or education related child care
costs actually incurred by Defendant during the pendency of this
action.

Child support and work or education related child care

costs are to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month and 1/2
on or before 20th of the month commencing July 20, 1991.
4.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant as temporary

alimony during the pendency of this action the sum of $1,000,00 per
month. Alimony is to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month
and 1/2 on or before the 20th of the month commencing July 20,
1991.
5.

The marital home of the parties is to be sold and the

proceeds divided equally except that Plaintiff is to pay $2,900.00
toward roof replacement and/or repairs from his share of the
proceeds.
6.

Plaintiff is awarded the exclusive possession and use of

the 1972 Porsche automobile during the pendency of this action.
Plaintiff is given the option to sell this vehicle and provide an
accounting to Defendant of the sale proceeds.
"7.

Defendant is awarded the exclusive possession and use of

the 1988 Dodge Caravan during the pendency of this action.
8.

Plaintiff is to provide to Defendant $1,500.00 as an
6
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advance on the support obligation to be paid by the Plaintiff to
Defendant which is to be credited against the child support and/or
alimony awarded Defendant.
9.

The parties are to divide the personal property between

them when moving and provide inventories to the other party.

Any

item of personal property in dispute should be placed in storage
until the parties can agree or until further order of the Court.
10.

Plaintiff is to maintain health and accident insurance

coverage for the Defendant and the minor children during the
pendency of this action, and is ordered to pay all hospital,
medical, dental, orthodontia and optical expenses of the minor
children not paid by insurance.
11.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all marital

indebtedness incurred prior to the filing of Plaintifffs Complaint.
12. Each party is to be responsible to pay 1/2 of the moving
expenses, with the final determination of apportionment of these
expenses to be made at the time of trial or settlement of this
case.
13. Each party is hereby restrained from annoying, harassing,
touching, harming, or injTiring the other and from interfering with
the other during the pendency of this action at their place of
-residence or at any other time and place. Further, with exception
-of sale of the marital home and the 1972 Porsche, neither party is
to sell, encumber, transfer, dispose or otherwise dissipate any of
the marital property during the pendency of this action without the
7
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mutual consent of both parties or order pf the Court.
DATED this

^

day of

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

JAJfES S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved:

LL

[£&<££. <_ 5"

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS(COMMISSIONER

^|4 °i\
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to H. Russell Hettinger, Attorney for Plaintiff, 800 Kennecott
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),
Code of Judicial Administration, on this

rZ/fl*~ day of August,

1991.
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